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Abstract: 
 
The course toward freedom pursued by late-nineteenth-century black activists is as ideologically 
and philosophically complicated as the question of freedom itself. Dynamics of gender, class, 
race, religion/spirituality, and one's experience with enslavement affected the schematization of 
the course.  
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Article: 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the discourse around black subjection and freedom was never 
far from a rhetoric and practice of enlightenment. According to critic Saidiya Hartman, "the 
equality of rights to be extended to freedmen depended upon the transformation of former slaves 
into responsible and reasonable men. As would be expected, the norms at issue were masculinity, 
rationality, and restraint."1 Indeed, before and after legislative emancipation, black freedom was 
paradoxically defined by its capacity for restraint. Not only did this definition emerge out of a 
white supremacist fiction and fear of black recklessness (or unenlightenment), but, more 
profoundly, it worked to shape and constrain performances of freedom advocated by black 
activists themselves. 
 
This essay examines how gender and class figured centrally in these performances and modes of 
comportment. In particular, I consider how David Walker's black reformist insistence on focused 
movement, moral uplift, and masculine refinement was often counterposed against (even if 
animated by) acts ideologically imagined as wayward, nonsensical, unenlightened, and off-track. 
Strikingly, the latter set of performances were often gendered and classed in ways that suggest a 
powerful set of associations (forged in Revolutionar y War-era American Enlightenment 
philosophy) between blackness, (the absence of) manhood, poverty, slavery, and 
unenlightenment. 
 
In particular, Thomas Jefferson, in Notes on the State of Virginia, argues that the "imagination 
[of black people] is wild and extravagant, escapes incessantly from every restraint of reason and 
taste, and, in the course of its vagaries, leaves a tract of thought [i]ncoherent and eccentric."2He 
further maintains that the "eccentric" absence of reason is attributable to "nature" and not to 
condition.3 In many ways, Jefferson's claim that black people privilege sentiment over reason 
resonates with European Enlightenment claims about white women. For Immanuel Kant, (white) 
women are more inclined to sense than reason, "love pleasantry and [being] entertained by 
trivialities."4 Implicit in Jefferson's formulation, then, is an understanding of black men (the 
default gender under attack) as lesser men, unmanly, indeed, feminine, unrestrained, and 
irrational.5 The language of comportment (how one holds oneself, behaves, performs) is, for 
Jefferson and other Enlightenment thinkers, always already racialized, gendered, and classed. 
 
Significantly, David Walker countered Jefferson's racist document by attributing black 
unenlightenment to white supremacy and racial slavery. His Appeal to The Coloured Citizens of 
the World (1829) is a formalized response to Jefferson and the Euro-American Enlightenment 
project, more broadly, as well as a call for a Black Enlightenment; an uplift project that 
dissociated enlightenment from racial difference but naturalized its relationship to manhood and 
formal education. For Walker, formal literacy and moral rectitude (what he esteems as central to 
the project of black enlightenment) facilitates the emergence of black manhood. Such manhood, 
determined as coextensive with racial enlightenment, is impossible if black people remain 
enslaved. Not only does slavery refer to actual bondage but also to a state of intellectual and 
moral ignorance. Whether legally free or not, to be uneducated is, for Walker, tantamount to 
enslavement. 
 
This assumption held by Walker and by leading statesmen and women connected to the reformist 
impulse in antislavery (Maria Stewart, Frederick Douglass, Martin Delany, et al.) held profound 
implications for formally illiterate radicals such as Sojourner Truth. Truth's illiteracy, for many, 
tied her to slavery and with it, unenlightenment; as a result, her rhetorical and bodily enactments 
of freedom were often reduced to a form of racialized, intellectual caricature. Even though Truth 
offered a philosophy of liberation, the racial, economic, and sexual logics of supposedly 
enlightened embodiment missed the profundity of her revolutionary movement. 
 
David Walker 
 
Antislavery activist and author of the Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World (1829), 
David Walker entered the world untethered to the shackle by law and yet haunted by its rattle. 
This particular contradiction was a painful reality for free blacks living in the Lower Cape Fear 
region of Wilmington, North Carolina, who were forced to cohabitate with the unfree. 
"[Reacting] with particular intensity against being grouped with the unfree—not, 
however, because he rejected slaves but because he reviled the condition that degraded his race," 
Walker asked for his mother's blessing to leave for the North.6 
 
In many ways, the ideological creation of the Appeal began in the Lower Cape Fear region and 
its writing commenced with Walker's departure. 
 
Having traveled over considerable portion of these United States, and having in the 
course of my travels taken the most accurate observation of things as they exist—the 
result of my observations has warranted the full and unshaken conviction that we, 
(coloured people of these United States) are the most degraded, wretched, and abject set 
of beings that ever lived since the world began, and I pray God, that none like us ever 
may live again until time shall be no more.7 
 
Traveling across the United States, for Walker, produced philosophical insight into the supposed 
wretchedness of the current and former enslaved as well as revealed the strange relationship 
between slavery and Enlightenment. Implicit in the Appeal is an argument connecting the 
degradation of slavery and unenlightenment as well as the suggestion that formal education, 
manhood, and middle-class values forge the performative conditions of freedom. The aim of 
the Appeal is to reconcile the causes of racialized, gendered wretchedness, embodied in some 
ways by the place from which Walker fled, Lower Cape Fear, and how this condition is both 
produced as well as remedied by a recuperated American enlightenment. 
 
The text's contradictory and complicated relationship with enlightenment is, in fact, a central 
structuring tension. The Appeal's preamble begins with an indictment of Euro-American 
waywardness, the vicious movements of enlightenment. Walker starts here because it is the 
"source from which most of our miseries proceed."8 It is this misery, a misery with a history that 
extends from the violently colonized nations of antiquity to the nineteenth-century United States, 
which has had God's ears ringing "with the cries, tears, and groans, of his oppressed 
people."9 For Walker, it is the background noise of this pain that constitutes a troublesome 
dissonance in this "Republican Land of Liberty!!!!!"10 
 
The use of exclamation marks indicates a deliberate and heartfelt emphasis on the idea of the 
United States as ideologically contradictory. Emotion erupts into the text to make this plain. I 
signal the exclamation mark for it constitutes an internal dissonance within the Appeal that 
breaks up the even (enlightened) tone that Walker sustains via language and ideology. 
Seemingly, the Appeal struggles in traveling rapidly away from a heart that threatens to burst. It 
is this irony, which has something to do with the haunting performativity of Lower Cape Fear 
that troubles Walker's own candidacy for Black Enlightenment. 
 
Returning to the Appeal, Walker continues with his critique by elaborating upon the ideological 
relation between hegemonic articulations of American enlightenment and the "causes of our 
wretchedness."11 Here, Walker condemns Thomas Jefferson's racist arguments about black 
inferiority in hisNotes and, accordingly, urges that black people be considered as subjects (as 
opposed to objects) of [American] enlightenment.12 To be a subject of enlightenment, for 
Walker, is to be free from harm. This belief speaks to Walker's larger political activism in 
Boston. In response to the endless persecution and harassment of the Boston black community, 
Walker became involved with a group that "endorsed a program that was fiercely anti-slavery 
and anti-discriminatory, that was committed to black improvement, especially through education, 
and that virtually obliged service to the black community at larg[e]."13 
 
Resistance to racist violence took the form of an enlightenment project, with improvement of the 
self becoming interchangeable with antislavery. Undoubtedly, the assumption that racism could 
be most effectively dismantled once black people acted free reveals a larger anxiety around the 
impact of slavery on black performance. As Saidiya Hartman observes, the degradation wrought 
by enslavement was counterposed to an uplifted manhood, "the prized figure of the discourse of 
racial uplift."14 In this way, degradation suggests an association between an unenlightenment 
(lack of formal literacy and middle-class mores) and femininity. Antislavery, for Walker, was 
predicated on a very particular masculinist narrative of social comportment, discernible as the 
antithesis of ignorance. In Article II: Our Wretchedness in Consequence of Ignorance, Walker 
observes the following: 
 
Ignorance, my brethren, is a mist, low down into the very dark and almost impenetrable 
abyss of which, our fathers for many centuries have been plunged. The Christians, and 
enlightened of Europe, and some of Asia, seeing the ignorance and consequent 
degradation of our fathers, instead of trying to enlighten them, by teaching them that 
religion and light with which God had blessed them, they have plunged them into 
wretchedness ten thousand times more intolerable, than if they had left them entirely to 
the Lord.15 
 
There is a complicated engagement with the European Enlightenment here; on the one hand, 
according to Walker, the projects of Christian humanism and imperialism carried the potential 
for black elevation. On the other hand, what the emissaries of the Enlightenment taught were 
lessons in black subjugation, lessons that, for Walker, continued to shape black political and 
social performance. 
 
Particularly, in his journey, Walker observes the absence of enlightenment in the form of scenes 
of collusion among the enslaved with the slaveholders. In viewing some of the practices of "my 
brethren in league with tyrants," Walker callously jettisons the possibility of fear and 
intimidation by blaming ignorance instead as the root cause.16 Despite the fact that resistance to 
slavery has often meant indirect, disclosed forms of opposition, Walker's position on  antislavery 
resistance is a self-assured conviction that "I would suffer my life to be taken before I would 
submit."17 
 
The ability to choose not to submit inscribes a narrative of agency into a situation where the 
enslaved are already scripted outside of such terms. Hartman problematizes the terms of 
resistance and will by arguing the following: 
 
If the forms of power determine what kinds of practice are possible within a given field, 
what are the prospects for calculated action given that the very meaning of slave property 
is "being subject to the master's will in all things," and that issues of consent, will, 
intentionality, and action are utterly meaningless, except in the instance of 'criminal' acts. 
Bearing this in mind, what possibilities for agency exist that don't put the enslaved at risk 
of a greater order of pain and punishment since the slave is a legal person only insofar as 
he is criminal and a violated body in need of limited forms of protection?18 
 
Following Hartman, the inscription of subject-status onto the enslaved at once defers a 
consideration of how it is that the slaves are already relegated outside of such liberal citizen-
subject paradigms—"being subject to the master's will in all things," as it were—as well as 
assumes that terror is not a structuring feature of the antebellum quotidian.19 
 
Further, Walker's accusatory and anxious tone should be considered within [a] rising new spirit" 
of Black Reform; one that "promoted racial solidarity and moral elevation."20 Embedded in the 
early-nineteenth-century Black Reform movement was a "painful paradox" that involved 
negotiating antislavery resistance and black solidarity on the one hand and an ideology of 
emancipation that aspired to "a fuller participation in the dominant white middle-class culture of 
the North" on the other.21 It is precisely this painful paradox that engenders what Hartman calls 
"the burdened individuality of freedom"; an ideological double bind that is marked by "the 
onerous responsibilities of freedom with the enjoyment of few of its entitlements, the collusion 
of the disembodied equality of liberal individuality with the dominated, regulated, and 
disciplined embodiment of blackness, the entanglements of sovereignty and subjection, and the 
transformation of involuntary servitude effected under the aegis of free labor."22 
 
The disciplining of blackness and black performance in Walker, then, was a twofold project. In 
criticizing the unenlightened, Walker disciplines and is disciplined: 
 
And when my curious observer comes to take notice of those who are said to be free 
(which assertion I deny) and who are making some frivolous pretensions to common 
sense, he will see that branch of ignorance among the slaves assuming a more cunning 
and deceitful course of procedure. He may see some of my brethren in league with 
tyrants, selling their own brethren into hell upon earth, not dissimilar to the exhibitions in 
Africa but in a more secret, servile and abject manner. Oh Heaven! I am full!!! I can 
hardly move my pen!!!23 
 
By taking a "standpoint outside himself "—to be the "curious observer" as it were—is to sustain 
both a straight and disinterested course of argumentation as well as to discipline himself as a 
black man of reason.24 The straightness of his course, however, is compromised with the 
irruption of "deceitful course[s] of procedure," introducing dark, dangerous roads and "African" 
detours into his path.25 In particular, Walker evokes Africa, and the equally elusive concept of 
"what happens there" as a way to criticize the absence of enlightenment among the enslaved. 
"Africa" is a scene of unenlightenment that also threatens to throw Walker off course. 
 
By preceding as well as serving as emotion's condition of possibility, Africa becomes tied to a 
whole set of terms Walker's European counterparts had already invented. Its (Africa's) 
metonymic relationship with Lower Cape Fear writ large (places Walker traveled to and "rapidly 
away" from), femininity, irrationality, and the anti-enlightenment is embodied and repressed 
through Walker's urgent call for his brethren to "stand and be MEN."26 
 
"Men of colour, who are also of sense, for you particularly is my Appeal designed."27 Walker 
calls upon this particular set of racially degraded "men of sense" to do the work of enlightening 
their more wretched brethren. These "ignorant brethren" include those who work in collusion 
with and claim happiness while performing tasks for their master. 
 
I met a coloured man in the street, a short time since, with a string of boots on his 
shoulder; we fell into conversation, and in course of which I said to him, what a 
miserable set of people we are! He asked why?—Said I, we are so subjected under the 
whites, that we cannot obtain the comforts of life, but by cleaning their boots and shoes, 
old clothes, waiting on them, shaving them, etc. Said he, (with the boots on his 
shoulders,) "I am completely happy!!! I never want to live any better or happier than 
when I can get a plenty of boots and shoes to clean!!!!"28 
 
Walker's subsequent critique of the man in the street's happiness invokes the previously 
discussed problem of agency. In other words, the rendering of his supposedly ignorant "brethren" 
as agent eclipses the complexity of how it is that the unenlightened move and resist in ways that 
are both recognizable and unrecognizable to Walker's curious observer. Perhaps the man in the 
street's happiness was a defensive posture adopted to deflect judgment from the well-dressed 
Northerner who arrogantly interrupted his walk to suggest a different path. Unfortunately, 
Walker uses the fact of a surface expression to determine the existential and philosophical depth, 
or wretchedness, of his more "ignorant" brethren. 
 
Certainly, Walker's man of non-sense was the reason for this Appeal. Women (both enslaved and 
free), are nowhere named as its subject. Their absence speaks of a larger anxiety surrounding 
women and reason as it related to the project of racial sense making. To be sure, black women, 
such as Maria Stewart, were centrally involved in the political project of black reformism. But 
even as she critiqued black male sexism, she had to tread carefully in the advocacy of (educated) 
black women's political freedom. Historian Martha Jones writes: 
 
A skilled rhetorician, Stewart crafted her message such that her provocations were muted 
by reassurances. Seemingly aware that some might question her right to speak in public, 
Stewart attempted to deflect overt criticism. . . . She celebrated female domesticity, 
urging women to influence husbands, children, and circles of acquaintance. Piety, 
"delicacy of manners," "gentleness and dignity," contempt for the vulgar and vile, 
prudence and economy were qualities to which she advised women to aspire. . . . 
Respectability marked the difference between slavery and freedom far more than it did 
that between private and public for women like Stewart.29 
 
By way of complication, the inclusion of black women in the project of racial uplift depended 
upon a specific kind of gendered and classed performance. Stewart's advocacy of black women's 
enlightenment, in some ways, introduced a new kind of "women's work." Black women are often 
described by Stewart as figures of influence, at once critiquing and sustaining patriarchal 
narratives of reason and progress.30 As historian Louise Newman argues, "[r]acial uplift entailed 
self-help, racial solidarity with black men (rather than criticism of them), temperance, thrift, 
chastity, social purity as well as acceptance of patriarchal authority."31 Because the performance 
of respectability here was predicated on an adherence to a particularly masculinist and 
patriarchal narrative of women's role in racial enlightenment, their presence in uplift was often 
always already absent. In many ways, black female gender was "inscribe[d] as a scene of 
negation," their wretchedness cloaked by patriarchal, middle-class-normative performance.32 
 
Further, what we know about Walker was that his mother was born free and his father enslaved. 
Can we assume, even still, that she remained among the wretched given that his (Walker's) 
subjects of enlightenment are "[m]en of colour, who are also of sense[?]"33 The irony stands 
however that despite his mother's absence, the performative conditions of the Appeal's possibility 
were predicated on her blessing. 
 
The particular kind of knowledge invested in Mrs. Walker's blessing is repressed (perhaps only 
to emerge as emotion) in favor of Walker's strenuous commitment to "prov[ing] to Americans 
and the world, that we are MEN."34 When Walker's pen threatens to stop moving, the specter of 
Mrs. Walker and the attendant set of haints of a feminized Lower Cape Fear (as well as other 
unspeakable locations), come to the surface endangering the straight course the Appeal otherwise 
engenders. It is precisely the force of the feminine that makes the difference in how Walker 
moves, either "solemnly tak[ing] a stand" or "with streaming eyes, compelled to shrink back into 
nothingness."35 
 
Shrinking back before God, back before his manhood, back into the place before he left his 
mother forms part of the set of performances that threaten to throw Walker off course. They 
suggest the presence of forces Hortense Spillers defines as Mother Right. In what follows, I 
quote Spillers at length: 
 
The African-American male has been touched, therefore, by the mother, handed by her in 
ways that he cannot escape, and in ways that the white American male is allowed to 
temporize by a fatherly reprieve. This human and historic development—the text that has 
been inscribed on the benighted heart of the continent—takes us to the center of an 
inexorable difference in the depths of American women's community: the African-
American woman, the mother, the daughter, becomes historically the powerful and 
shadowy evocation of a cultural synthesis long evaporated—the law of the Mother—only 
and precisely because legal enslavement removed the African-American male not so 
much from sight as from mimetic view as a partner in the prevailing social fiction of the 
Father's name, the Father's law. Therefore, the female, in this order of things, breaks in 
upon the imagination with a forcefulness that marks both a denial and an "illegitimacy." 
Because of this peculiar American denial, the black American male embodies 
the only American community of males that has had the specific occasion to 
learn who the female is within itself, the infant child who bears the life against the could-
be-fateful gamble, against the odds of pulverization and murder, including her own. It is 
the heritage of the mother that the African American male must regain as an aspect of his 
own personhood—the power of "yes" to the "female" within.36 
 
As "the shadowy evocation of a cultural synthesis long evaporated," Mother Right asserts itself 
in Walker's text in ways equally visible and invisible.37Walker's pen and the abundance of 
exclamation marks demonstrate the irrepressibility of emotion, those things feminine, those 
things unseemly to this man "of sense," while, at the same time, marking the absolute 
illegitimacy of Mother Right. This is an illegitimacy that manifests in her resolute nonexistence 
as a site of violation and as the subject of enlightenment. Walker says "no"—albeit emphatic and 
with a decidedly unmasculine pitch—to the "female" within. Early in the Appeal, Walker 
exclaims, "I am with streaming eyes, compelled to shrink back into nothingness before my 
Maker, and exclaim again, thy will be done, O Lord God Almighty!"38 To exclaim again, "thy 
will be done" is a move that nullifies the ontological specificity of the zone to which Walker 
might shrink back. It is not a nothingness, but rather a something to which Walker cannot 
possibly make a direct Appeal. 
 
Walker misses the mark of this something. While identifying at the end of the Appeal as "one of 
the oppressed, degraded, and wretched sons of Africa," one question becomes abundantly 
urgent.39 In his claim to be a son, where did his mother go? She appears as the necessary 
blessing, the "influence," borrowing Stewart's language, for Walker's rapid travel to the North. 
Yet, she is shadowly evoked and foreclosed when the category of those to be saved leaves 
mothers by the wayside. 
 
Tragically, black women who were associated with the vestiges of slavery—residing in the 
South, lacking formal literacy and middle-class respectability, or who were born enslaved—were 
marginal in conversations on freedom. Not only were poor, illiterate, black women excluded 
from the project of black enlightenment, but they were further silenced by concurrent projects of 
racial and sexual freedom. Critic Louise Newman discusses their exclusion from white women's 
abolitionism and suffragist discourse: 
 
The exclusion of enslaved black women from the categories of both "slaves" and 
"women" was a common feature of white abolitionist suffragist discourse, although white 
women sometimes invoked claims to a universal sisterhood that contained assumptions 
about a universal womanly character. At the same time, the tropes of sisterhood and uplift 
began to foster and reflect a new self-understanding among white women that they, as 
white women, had a moral responsibility to reform an evil social and political system. As 
historian Jean Fagan Yellin has pointed out, these tropes were readily apparent in 
iconography that white female abolitionists used on their stationery and transformed into 
folk art through their needlework. The imagery depicted a kneeling slave-supplicant 
asking the question "Am I Not A Woman and a Sister?" A phrase that white suffragist 
Frances Gage put in the mouth of Sojourner Truth when she retold Truth's 1851 address 
("Ar'n't I a Woman?) in the article Gage published in 1863.40 
 
Enslaved black women were often imagined as "fallen" because of the level of amoral sexual 
brutality experienced while in captivity. In some ways, they were conceived of as moving off-
course, aimless in their relation to white feminist humanism.41 Being off-course and fallen is 
juxtaposed to the already uplifted white woman. Strikingly, as observed in Newman's description 
of the disturbingly pervasive iconography of the "slave supplicant," this moral difference is often 
represented as a pose.  
 
The anonymous, generic slave woman that accessorized nineteenth century white women's 
stationery is fixed outside of language and subjectivity, as blank, decorative performativity. This 
is instructive when we consider the ways that Sojourner Truth also constituted a blank page for 
the projections of others. I am interested in how the radical, spiritually forged activism and 
philosophy of Sojourner Truth was fixed at the margins of other people's reason. Further, I argue 
that this marginalization of Truth was achieved through the coercive theatricalizations by others; 
theatricalizations that manifest themselves at the level of externally imposed gestures, accents 
and deeds.42 I believe that there is an intense relationship between the codification of Truth as 
boundless "plot space" (a body that rehearses and performs according to the needs of others) and 
a deeper anxiety over the threat a particular kind of eccentric (which is always already working-
class) performance posed to the politics of social re/form. In many ways, Truth's itinerancy and 
purported eccentricity presented a crisis for a patriarchal, uplift-oriented politics that otherwise 
required her to stay posed and in place. 
 
Sojourner Truth 
 
Born in Hurley, Ulster County, New York, in the late 1790s, Sojourner Truth (known then as 
Isabella) grew up enslaved and spent most of her childhood in a "cold, dark, and damp cellar . . . 
on the eastern side of Roundout Creek."43 She lived there with her parents, James and Betsey, 
and brother Peter. Upon slaveowner Charles Hardinbergh's death, Isabella's family broke up, 
sending Isabella to work for two more owners, John Neely and John Dumont, respectively. 
Enduring great cruelties at the hands of Neely and Dumont, Isabella survived through prayer, 
learning from her mother that if "she spoke out loud to God and asked Him for direction, He 
would always come to her rescue."44 
 
Isabella's "dialogic relationship with God" was such that when the time came to leave the 
Dumont plantation, she sought His assistance in revealing the "deeper pattern" for her 
escape.45 Because slaves in New York were to be emancipated in 1826, Isabella promptly 
informed Dumont of the date of her departure. While Dumont initially agreed to emancipate 
Isabella at this time, he subsequently changed his mind upon an assessment of Isabella's changes 
in labor value (she suffered a bodily injury). Though consenting to stay longer to compensate for 
her decline in value, Isabella eventually left. "In 1826, Isabella heard the voice of her God 
instructing her when to set out on her own as a free woman. Just before dawn in the late fall, she 
left the Dumonts' carrying only her baby, Sophia, and a supply of food so meager that it fit in a 
cotton handkerchief."46 
 
God "directed her steps . . . to the safe asylum" of the Van Wagenen residence, a distant 
acquaintance.47 She stayed with the Van Wagenens for a few months though foresaw an eventual 
return to her former master, John Dumont. Despite the atrocities committed by Dumont, 
including the illegal sale of her son Peter to a Southern slaveholder, Isabella was divinely 
informed that she should still return to him. It was on the occasion of her return that Jesus Christ 
illuminated the ever-presence of His friendship for Isabella. 
 
This phantasmatic encounter occurred as she mounted herself and child onto Dumont's carriage 
for the passage back to the farm. It was then that she felt the omnipotence of God. He was 
everywhere, guiding every step and maneuver she would make. But it was also at this moment 
that she experienced God's omnipotence to be as miraculous as it was frightening, "with the 
breath of his mouth, [a] lamp [is blown out] so that no spark remains."48 Contemplating the 
possibly annihilating potential of a deep proximity to God, Isabella was soon soothed by the 
intervention of "a friend who appeared to stand between herself and the insulted Deity."49 This 
friend, she observes, was Jesus. As Frances Titus recounts, it was here that Isabella became 
symbolically baptized in the Holy Spirit. 
 
It was from that moment on that Christ became a consistent mediating force between Isabella 
and the overwhelming luminescence of God, helping Isabella carve out her place of reason in 
God's light: "The place she selected . . . was a lonely spot, and chosen by her for its beauty, its 
retirement, and because she thought that there, in the noise of those waters, she could speak 
louder to God, without being overheard by any who might pass that way."50 During her 
enlightenment, Truth had to be cautious so as to not be "overheard." What is further interesting 
in Frances Titus's account (within which this anecdote is featured) is the way that Truth's 
communion with reason is untrespassed by her amanuensis. Titus, who otherwise attempts to 
"commodify [her] subject's interior life" in the Narrative of Sojourner Truth, leaves Isabella's 
conversations with God alone.51 Not only did she recount the Lord's Prayer in Dutch, but she also 
spoke with an invisible interlocutor.52 The fact that this central element in Truth's reason is 
indecipherable reveals its successful subversion of colonial surveillance while foreshadowing 
how Truth's purported eccentricity was diagnosed precisely because of these kinds of resistances 
to other people's reason. We will return to examine the performative effects of this resistance, but 
for now, it is important to understand the central role God played in Truth's enlightenment. 
 
The conversations with God that began at that "small island" intensified with time, and in such a 
way as to mark as glorious as intimidating her religious conversion to Methodism. It was 
Methodism, in particular, that enabled Isabella to "discove[r] a new means of power, what 
Pentecostals call the power of the Spirit, that redressed the balance between someone poor and 
black and female and her rich white masters."53 
 
Having been racially excluded from New York City's prominent John Street Church, she joined 
the African Zion church. It was during this time that she met and began to work for James 
Latourette. Latourette, "having left the regular Methodist church, because of its falling away 
from the ideals of John Wesley," began to organize small meetings for the dissatisfied faithful, 
among them Isabella. Known as the "Holy Club," this particular sect promoted self-
righteousness, moral propriety, and asceticism. The small group eventually became tied to a 
burgeoning movement called "New York Perfectionism [which] sought to eradicate the 
corruption of this world, just as John Wesley's Methodism was meant to purify the Anglican 
Church."54 What is more, for Isabella, the narrative of moral rectitude was disaggregated (unlike 
black reformism) from sexual and economic difference. "Thirty years of enslavement and 
sleeping on pallets in Dutch kitchens shaped Isabella's understanding that neither unfortunate 
circumstances nor proximity to 'evil' was synonymous with moral degradation."55 
 
Arguably, this refusal to associate slavery with degradation or wretchedness is partly responsible 
for Truth's marginalization in historical narratives of antislavery activism. Though she is 
remembered as an iconic (albeit stagnant and excessive in that iconography), proto-black 
feminist, her black radicalism is often overshadowed by the critiques of prominent black 
statesman during that era, including Frederick Douglass and Martin Delany. Delany, for 
example, heavily criticized black people's association with white people, particularly 
associations that contained though were not necessarily defined by an economic relationship 
(Isabella worked for The Grears, the Piersons, and the Prophet Matthias during her membership 
in their Second-Day Adventist groups). "For the most part, unseen holy women like [Catherine] 
Ferguson and Isabella, who performed household labor and were known more for piety than for 
wealth or agitation, served as targets of criticism. The educated black abolitionist, Martin 
Delany, for instance, berated blacks satisfied to live as servants."56 
 
Because Isabella's "politics of race" were always mediated by forces larger than the State—
belonging to the ethical and metaphysical realm of the Holy Spirit—her "ways out of 
humiliation" were figured as more eccentric and problematic than complex.57 Black and white 
itinerant female preachers, though attuned to the sinfulness of racism and sexism as instantiated 
practices, prioritized being true to oneself and God as paramount goals. This feature, in 
conjunction with the oft-observed fact of female preachers' tendency toward being "outspoken 
and unconstrained," rendered their contributions to black history relatively neglected.58 
 
Concerning the latter, Isabella/Truth's "outspokenness" served as reason enough for her 
unharmonious relations with prominent black reformers and abolitionists. Like Delany, Frederick 
Douglass was often unsettled by Truth: 
 
Frederick Douglass's first meeting with Truth occurred at Northampton (a utopian 
society), as Douglass was charting a course into freedom divergent from hers. Like many 
other fugitive slaves, Douglass associated illiteracy with enslavement, and strove to 
complete his emancipation through the acquisition of fluency—elegance, in his case—in 
reading and writing. He saw himself as a statesman-in-the-making and modeled his 
comportment on the well-educated antislavery leaders with whom he worked. 
 
Though some twenty years younger than Truth, Douglass patronized her industry and 
amiability, calling her one of the community's most useful members "in its day of small 
things." What most galled Douglass was Truth's lack of sympathy with his own means of 
personal rebirth. While Douglass was schooling himself to "speak and act like a person of 
cultivation and refinement," Truth, he said, "seemed to feel it her duty to trip me up in my 
speeches and to ridicule my efforts." Douglass saw Truth as "a genuine specimen of the 
uncultured [N] egro," who cared very little for elegance of speech or refinement of 
manners.59 
 
There are several interesting points to remember from this observation. As demonstrated earlier, 
the association of illiteracy with enslavement is a key belief in black reform literature emerging 
during this period. We observed how this association played out in Walker's argumentation about 
his more "ignorant brethren." It emerges again in Martin Delany's, the father of Black 
Nationalism, writings, specifically manifesting as an inscribed, backward "Negro dialect." 
Generally, there is an underlying connection between backward speech and behavior, speaking 
out or being "outspoken" in Truth's case, and an alleged complicity with an enslaved (as opposed 
to reformed and enlightened) posture. 
 
Furthermore, in Douglass's case, something about the way Truth moved and spoke "tripped" him 
up. I'm reminded here of the "African" scenes in Walker'sAppeal, how recalling images of 
subjection made his pen stop. Indeed, these scenes resonate with Gayatri Spivak's arguments on 
the sublime: 
 
It is not too excessive to say that we are programmed, or better, tuned to feel the inadequacy of 
the imagination (thus tripping the circuit to the superiority of reason) through the pain incited by 
the Sublime. The language is persistently one of inescapable obligation, although the concept in 
question is that of freedom.60 
 
The feeling of the sublime is, indeed, a feeling of magnitude, incapable of being fully expressed 
by reason. It produces either extraordinary pain or pleasure. In short, it moves. In the case of 
Sojourner Truth, her very presence moved Douglass enough for his feet to begin tripping the 
circuits into reason's superiority, making claims that Truth herself was a "genuine specimen of 
the uncultured [N]egro," who "cared very little for elegance of speech or refinement of 
manners."61  
It is precisely this patronizing refusal of Truth's profundity that affected the representation of her 
in subsequent years. Truth, for Douglass and others, was more often than not represented "as 
otherness through the use of what they [historians, critics, reformers, et al.] thought was Negro 
dialect and they dwelled at length on descriptions of her body."62 Truth was her name. She 
moved herself and others in ways that exceeded the imagination. As a result, those who tripped 
the circuits into reason theatricalized Truth as "quaint," a "special human, not one that could bind 
up the whole people through her unremitting figuring of critical difference—that is, not an 
unruly agent preaching her own unique gospel of displacement as the ground of connection."63 
 
Because Sojourner Truth was consistently figured as outside of reason and with it, 
counterhegemonic projects of racial and gender sense-making, she was subjected to the 
peripatetic whims of the literate public's imagination; that is, those who recorded, codified, and 
ultimately nonconsensually theatricalized her countless philosophical performances. Tragically, 
the descriptions of these philosophical performances, most notably Truth's famous (and 
invented) speech act Ar'n't I am Woman? push the limits of accuracy with accent, gesture, and 
imagery. 
 
Truth was heard in multiple ways but I have chosen two, the first by Marius Robinson, editor of 
the Ohio Bugle and the second by (white) women's rights advocate and abolitionist Frances Dana 
Gage to illustrate the radically divergent impressions Truth's movement made: 
 
Marius Robinson: 
One of the most unique and interesting speeches of the convention was made by 
Sojourner Truth, an emancipated slave. It is impossible to transfer it to paper, or convey 
an adequate idea of the effect it produced upon the audience: 
 
May I say a few words? Receiving an affirmative answer, she proceeded; I want to say a 
few words about this manner. I am a woman's rights. I have as much muscle as any man, 
and can do as much work as any man. I have plowed and reaped and husked and chopped 
and mowed, and can any man do more than that? I have heard much about the sexes 
being equal; I can carry as much as any man, and can eat as much too, if I can get it. I am 
strong as any man that is now. As for intellect, all I can say is, if a woman have a pint and 
man a quart—why cant she have her little pint full? You need not be afraid to give us our 
rights for fear we will take too much, for we can't take more than our pint'll hold.64 
 
Frances Dana Gage: 
Slowly from her seat rose Sojourner Truth, who, till now, had hardly lifted her head. 
"Don't let her speak," gasped a half-dozen in my ear. . . . There was a hissing sound of 
disapprobation above and below. I rose and announced "Sojourner Truth," and begged 
the audience to keep silence for a few moments. The tumult subsided at once, and every 
eye was fixed on this almost Amazon form, which stood nearly six feet high, head erect, 
and eye piercing the upper air like one in a dream. 
 
"Well, chillen, whar dar's so much racket dar must be som'ting out o' kilter. I tink dat, 
'twixt the niggers of the de South and de women at de Norf, all a-talking 'bout rights, de 
white men will be in a fix pretty soon. But what's all this here talking 'bout? Dat man over 
dar say dat woman needs to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have 
de best place eberywhar. Nobody eber helps me into carriages, or ober mud-puddles, or 
gives me any best place"; and, raising herself to her full height, and her voice to a pitch 
like rolling thunder, she asked, "And ar'n't I a woman? Look at me. Look at my arm," and 
she bared her right arm to the shoulder, showing its tremendous muscular power. "I have 
plowed and planted and gathered into barns, and no man could head me—and ar'n't I a 
woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man, (when I could get it,) and bear 
de lash as well—and ar'n't I a woman? I have borne thirteen chillen, and seen 'em mos' all 
sold off into slavery, and when I cried out a mother's grief, none but Jesus heard—and 
ar'n't I a woman? When dey talks 'bout dis ting in de head. What dis dey call 
it?""Intellect," whispered some one near. "Dat's it, honey. What's dat got to do with 
woman's rights or niggers' rights? If my cup won't hold but a pint and you holds a quart, 
wouldn't ye be mean not to let me have my little half-measure full?65 
 
The differences between Robinson's and Gage's versions are nothing less than striking. While 
Robinson ("who was familiar with Truth's diction") recorded her speech in "standard" English, 
Gage represented Truth with an "inconsistent dialect" "modeling Truth's idiom on a conception 
of Southern black plantation speech to which readers of Uncle Tom's Cabin had been 
accustomed."66 The association between Southern black plantation speech and Truth at once 
"fails to account for black speech patterns in the Ulster County area (Upstate New York, where 
Truth was enslaved)" and implicitly renders the idiom of black plantation speech the sign par 
excellence of ignorance.67 For example, Gage's rendition finds Truth unable to "locate" the word 
for ignorance. Here, most explicitly, the conflation of a "plantation speech" with ignorance 
becomes the occasion for one's movement off-course, being lost as it were in the abyss of 
unawareness. 
 
Gage's Truth is quaintly unaware, her speech powerful though muddled in such ignorance that it 
succeeds in losing Gage's attention. "Turning again to another objector, she took up the defense 
of Mother Eve. I cannot follow her through it all. It was pointed and witty and solemn; eliciting 
at almost every sentence deafening applause."68 This comes at the end of Truth's speech, at the 
end and beginning of Truth's philosophy. This is precisely where Gage admits to having lost her. 
She cannot follow her through it all. 
 
Deep below the superficial assumptions concerning the incomprehensibility of Truth's diction, 
there exists the inescapable fact that something in the way Truth philosophized and performed 
threw Gage off. They were no longer on the same path, in this case, (white) women's advocacy. 
Truth was somewhere else, enmeshed in an antebellum imaginary that Gage created and that 
black reformists determined as unenlightened and unfree, an imaginary with limits that Truth 
maneuvered and exceeded. As Donna Haraway argues, 
 
[P]erhaps, we need to see her [Sojourner Truth] as the Afro-Dutch-English New World 
itinerant preacher whose disruptive and risk-taking practices led her to "leave the house 
of bondage, to leave the subject-making (and humanist) dynamics of master and slave, 
and seek new names in a dangerous world. This sojourner's truth offers an inherently 
unfinished but potent reply to Pilate's skeptical query "What is Truth?"69 
 
Isabella's new name revealed that the truth was in the sojourn. Her path toward freedom was its 
own, independent though sometimes concurrent with the courses that moved beside it. 
Sojourner's Truth, truth's sojourn, sometimes tripped people up, and contained bends and turns 
that prevented others from following it. The trip was hers alone. 
 
The course toward freedom pursued by late-nineteenth-century black activists is as ideologically 
and philosophically complicated as the question of freedom itself. Dynamics of gender, class, 
race, religion/spirituality, and one's experience with enslavement affected the schematization of 
the course. For David Walker, growing up in a region where the free and unfree were made to 
live together inspired his quick departure. His path toward freedom was shaped by competing 
desires; the anxiety around this path's moving quickly out and forward to the North ran tide and 
tied with another anxiety concerning the curves the memories of his home were wont to produce. 
Walker's path ran with and against itself, pausing now and then to recover a tired journeyer 
whose full heart threatened to lead him astray. 
 
Sojourner Truth's path was unpredictable in shape, as heavenly guidance inspired a different pace 
and direction. It seemed that Frederick Douglass wished she moved a little faster, more directly 
and upright, and kept up with his pace (and progress). Though many, like Douglass, were 
frustrated with how differently she moved, Sojourner Truth stuck to her pace. She neither sped 
up to others nor attempted to slow down so much that others could follow her. 
 
Though these activists have dramatically different conceptions of the path, they share a similar 
desire for free movement. It is this desire that forms the junction where divergent ideas about 
antislavery, freedom, enlightenment and conduct, publicity and privacy come together and reveal 
the impact of slavery on the gendered and classed philosophical performances of black humanity 
after captivity.  
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